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fascinating field. Main topics are the 
ownership of the enterprise, hiring 
the right people, paying for A while 
hoping for B, task and job design, 
and alignment in organisations. 
When considering the question of 
supply chain governance, a key 
question is: which party should own 
which part of the chain? Candidates 
are farmers, intermediaries, retailers 
and consumers. 
 The best-known structure is 
the publicly owned stock market 
company, but most organisations 
are not publicly listed or owned 
by external shareholders. Family-
owned entrepreneurial companies, 
for instance, fall into this category. 
Many organisations, such as hospitals 
and universities, have no owners in 
the conventional sense. They are 
In my recent paper, Pooling, 
Access, and Countervailing Power 
in Channel Governance, I review 
how a longstanding traditional policy 
of paying its producer members by 
quantity rather than quality, threatened 
not only the image of The Greenery, 
but also its very existence. 
 I also consider how a willingness 
to change its by-laws and policies 
on payment in reaction to that threat 
saved the business. The change in 
emphasis that shifted the distribution 
of surpluses, rewarding higher 
quality producers more than lower 
quality ones, means The Greenery’s 
pie is today larger, delivering a win- 
win scenario.
Economics of organisations
The economics of organisations is a 
foundations. My own longstanding 
special interest is in organisations 
owned by suppliers, especially 
agricultural co-operatives.
 The Greenery B.V. is one of the 
leading companies in Europe in the 
fruit and vegetable sector. Its main 
activity is to provide a complete 
range of fruits and vegetables to 
supermarket chains in Europe, North 
America and the Far East throughout 
the year. Other major target groups 
are wholesale businesses, catering 
companies and industrial processing 
companies. The company has some 
2,500 employees, while 1,500 
producers own its shares. They 
are members of the horticultural 
co-operative Coforta U.A. and 
they market all their products via 
The Greenery.
 The Greenery has gone through 
various governance structure changes. 
It started as a merger between nine 
regional fruit and vegetable auction 
co-operatives in December 1996. 
They combined all their assets and 
activities into Voedingstuinbouw 
Nederland (VTN). VTN is the 100 per 
cent shareholder of The Greenery. 
The organisation integrated forward 
by acquiring the fresh produce 
wholesalers Dutch Van Dijk Delft 
Group and the Fresh Produce Division 
of Perkins Food plc, a UK-based 
wholesaler in 1998. 
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The inference behind the economic principle known as Gresham’s 
Law is that ‘bad money drives out good money’. The Greenery, 
a €1bn-plus annual turnover fruit and vegetable processing co-
operative in the Netherlands, found this to be almost literally true. 
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“Many co-operatives nowadays spend considerable 
effort in redesigning their income rights in terms of 
developing member benefit programmes.”
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 It is possible to cite a number of 
good reasons for co-ops to form. If 
small-scale farmers join forces to deal 
with retailers, it increases their joint 
bargaining power with those retailers. 
This is an important consideration 
in the case of perishable goods. 
Ownership of a processing company 
gives access to the processing state of 
the cycle, further increasing bargaining 
power. Some co-ops have become 
very large organisations in their own 
right, turning over billions of dollars.
The basics of ownership
Ownership is a crude instrument 
to align interests. There is more to 
enterprises than their ownership 
structure. Nowadays enterprises 
are characterised in terms of their 
governance structure, specifying 
the structure of ownership, decision, 
and income rights. The ownership 
rights specify who formally owns the 
enterprise. For example, farmers 
are the owners of an agricultural 
co-operative. 
 Decision rights specify who may 
take decisions on the strategies and 
policies of the organisation, as well as 
on the use of assets and thereby on 
the employment of people working with 
these assets. 
 Decision rights include the allocation 
of authority (delegation, centralisation), 
decision control (rat i f ication, 
monitoring), decision management 
(initiation, implementation), task 
design, conflict resolution, and 
choosing enforcement mechanisms. 
 Income rights are rights to the 
(monetary) benefits and costs resulting 
from the activities of the organisation. 
Income rights are reflected in the 
composition of cost and payment 
schemes, thereby creating the 
incentive system. Examples of income 
rights in co-operatives are direct and 
indirect benefits of patronage, cost and 
benefit allocation schemes like pooling 
arrangements, and the compensation 
package of the members of the 
management team.
 Many co-operatives nowadays 
spend considerable ef for t in 
redesigning their income rights in 
terms of developing member benefit 
programmes. Examples are quantity 
discounts, quality premiums, service 
at cost, offering favourable possibilities 
to supply financial funds for specific 
members, and supplying services 
tailored to the broader interests of 
specific members. It is in line with 
the normative implication of the 
increasing heterogeneity for the 
efficiency of traditional cooperatives 
that the impact of the collective 
features has to be reduced.
Income rights
Even the best-laid plans of mice 
and man, however, are subject to 
change, and change came to affect 
The Greenery, adversely, when 
the inadequacies of its payment 
pooling structure began to become 
clear. Various large growers left The 
Greenery to launch their own product-
specific bargaining associations 
over the next few years. Finally, 
various bargaining associations 
merged again with The Greenery 
after the introduction of member 
benefit programmes.
 As I note in my paper, pooling 
is an important aspect in many 
organisations. In his 1998 paper, 
researcher J. Nilsson observes 
that the principle of equal treatment 
within agricultural co-operatives is 
traditionally strong. For example, 
prices are not always differentiated 
based on quality and quantity, and 
member control, eg, the general 
rule is that all members have equal 
voting rights. The economic impact of 
equal treatment is that revenues and 
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form of ownership structure and 
channel governance remain 
unanswered, however. 
 Around one-third of world 
production today goes through co-
ops. Which means two-thirds does 
not. Which is best? Ownership and 
income rights have been addressed, 
but decision rights have not. Bijman et 
al. (2012) address decision rights by 
distinguishing various board models 
in co-operatives. Successful co-
operatives accommodate the diverging 
interests of their membership and 
the co-operative enterprise in one 
organisation. This is done by doing 
justice to the specific interests of 
the stakeholders in the design of 
coherent ownership, decision, and 
income rights. 
This article draws its inspiration 
from the paper Pooling, Access, and 
Countervailing Power in Channel 
Governance, which was written by 
George W.J. Hendrikse and published 
in Management Science, 2011, 57(9), 
1692-2002.
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and veg version of Gresham’s Law, 
referred to earlier.
Positive image
Co-operatives emerge as a response 
to market failure. That is, the market 
does not provide certain products 
and services. Once co-ops came 
into existence, they largely enjoyed 
a positive image because of their 
communitarian philosophy, rooted in 
the determination to maximise price 
and profit for the ultimate suppliers 
of the goods being sold, rather than 
for intermediaries such as wholesale 
buyers and retail sellers. 
 Was that image damaged by the 
events that unfolded at The Greenery? 
It certainly came under threat. The 
management took action to rectify the 
situation and keep the growers inside 
The Greenery to maintain bargaining 
power. They changed the remuneration 
policy to place more emphasis on 
quality than on quantity.
 Today, co-op payment policies are 
such that sometimes only high quality 
producers tend to be members. They 
tend to be too demanding for low 
quality producers. In this scenario, 
the distribution of any surplus 
rewards the higher quality producers 
more than lower quality producers. 
The pie is larger and the division of 
the pie has changed. Various 
questions surrounding the optimum 
costs are allocated to a certain extent 
independent of quantity and/or quality. 
 The increasing grower hetero-
geneity poses also a challenge for 
traditional grower organisations 
because various aspects of these 
governance structures are tailored 
towards homogeneous members. 
Heterogeneous co-operatives have 
difficulties in keeping highly innovative 
growers.  In the case of The Greenery, a 
number of large growers left due to the 
cross-subsidisation of small growers. 
 Innovative growers started product-
specific bargaining associations. 
There were also some innovative 
growers leaving the co-operative in 
order to form bargaining associations 
and marketing co-operatives to 
advance their specific interests. They 
felt that marketing efforts could be 
improved to highlight their products.
 Organisations can change internal 
policies to keep high quality members. 
Adjusting the pooling scheme brought 
farmers back. The Greenery moved 
away from its pooling practice to 
tailor services to different member 
groups as far as possible. To bring 
the better producers back, The 
Greenery changed its policy to one 
based on quality as well as quantity. 
If you pay the producers of bad 
cucumbers the same as you pay 
the producers of good cucumbers, 
producers will leave. This is the fruit 
